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Cadres on the Diplomatic Stage. The Social Origins 
and Career Patterns of GDR’s Ambassadors 
Ronald Gebauer  
Abstract: »Kader auf dem diplomatischen Parkett. Soziale Herkunft und Kar-
rieremuster der DDR-Botschafter«. After the Second World War the Soviet-
occupied part of Germany was forced to follow the Marxist-Leninist paradigm. 
Thus, the acceptance of communist domination by the East German people was 
low and from the very beginning the SED regime was additionally confronted 
with a considerable lack of international recognition. Just after the founding of 
the GDR, the leading SED realized the very importance of international repre-
sentation for their project of an alternative, “peaceful” and “progressive” Ger-
many. Thus, significant steps were taken towards the construction of a fully 
functioning Foreign Ministry. This contribution analyses the near completely 
recorded population (n = 204) of GDR ambassadors in the Central Cadre Data-
base (CCDB), mirroring their individual job biographies. The aim of the study 
in this respect is to deepen the knowledge of career paths and determinants of 
the diplomatic body of the GDR by using techniques of sequence analysis (op-
timal matching). 
Keywords: Communism, GDR, diplomatic corps, ambassadors, biographical 
data. 
1. GDR’s Foreign Policy and the Construction of a new 
Diplomatic Corps 
“Ambassadors of peace” – this was the ambitious self-image of the ambassa-
dors of the German Democratic Republic. When the GDR was founded back in 
1949, the first foreign policy declaration on October 24th was as follows:  
In an endeavour of the German people to take its place among the free and 
peaceful people again and in order to consolidate peace and to maintain and 
promote friendly relations with all nations, the provisional government of the 
GDR considers the establishment of diplomatic, economic and other relation-
ships as desirable and necessary (Muth 2000: 7). 
Apart from this noble aspiration, however, foreign policy in general had 
been an integral part of the SED power system and an expression of the actual 
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SED party line and was last but not least, particularly in the first years of 
GDR’s existence, completely dependent on Soviet foreign policy and Deutsch-
landpolitik. So it comes by no surprise that GDR’s diplomatic activity was first 
and foremost determined by East-West confrontation and shifts in the balance 
of superpowers (cf. Lemke 1994). At least three periods of diplomatic activity 
can be distinguished (cf. Muth 2000: 100): First, the initial phase of construct-
ing GDR’s foreign policy and consequently a diplomatic corps in the time 
between 1949 to 1953/55, second a long period best circumscribed by GDR’s 
considerable efforts to extend diplomatic activities during the time of her 
struggle for international recognition between 1955 and 1972, and third a con-
solidation phase with increasing inflexibility until 1989. The following com-
ments will focus only on the first two periods.1 
Ad 1) In the initial phase of the GDR the Stalinist approach was enforced on 
the whole of East Germany. This means that there had been created an adminis-
trative apparatus by selecting cadres signalling high loyalty and readiness to 
adapt to the up-to-date party line.2 Additionally, the founding myth of the sec-
ond German state as that of an antifascist and progressive Germany urged the 
SED leadership to destroy any continuity to the National Socialist regime. This, 
of course, was only partly realistic for several reasons (cf. McLellan 2004, Best 
/ Salheiser 2006, Best 2010). Particularly, foreign policy, as the window to-
wards the international community was to reflect this antifascist ambition in a 
radical way. Any impression of a personnel continuity to previous Nazi Ger-
many’s Foreign Office, which the new West German Foreign Office was 
blamed for (cf. Conze et al. 2010, Jacobsen / Smith 2007, Döscher 1987), had 
to be avoided. Thus, in accordance with ideological principles, an entirely new 
and loyal staff had to be recruited and the ‘ideal’ GDR diplomat was imagined 
as that of proletarian origin, long-term member of Germany’s CP and even 
better, albeit not necessary, as a member of antifascist resistance, or in the case 
of POWs (former Wehrmacht soldiers) at least attracting attention by pro-
Soviet activities as a member of the National Committee Free Germany (Na-
tionalkommitee Freies Deutschland, NKFD) or the Union of German Officers 
(Bund Deutscher Offiziere, BDO). This new shaped elite could not draw from 
own foreign policy experience and so GDR’s Foreign Ministry had been con-
tinuously changed, in order to quickly adapt to the international stage. Between 
1949 and 1955 five reforms were conducted, which resulted in a structure of 
five major departments, in essence three country departments (I. socialist coun-
tries, II. capitalist countries and III. Deutschlandpolitik and additionally de-
                                                             
1  For an English introduction to GDR’s foreign policy, cf. Winrow 1990: 15-32, for the final 
years of the SED regime, cf. Scholtyseck 2003: 28-52, Siebs 1999. 
2  In relation to empirical evidence on cadre selection and advancement criteria in various 
GDR employment sectors, cf. Best 2009, Salheiser 2009a. 
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partments for IV. consular affairs and V. press and propaganda).3 This was the 
general frame in which GDR’s diplomatic corps launched diplomatic missions 
in foreign countries. For the first eight missions of the GDR (USSR, Poland, 
ČSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, China and North Korea). SED chose only 
experienced, partly famous, communist antifascists, for example the writer 
Friedrich Wolf as ambassador to Warsaw. Decisions of cadre selection and 
advancement in general had to be confirmed via nomenklatura-principle by the 
SED power apparatus and not – as one can think of – by GDR’s government: 
Ambassadors, councillors of commerce and executives of commercial agencies 
committees (Handelsvertretungen) had to be confirmed by the SED-
Politbureau, and all other diplomatic staff of diplomatic missions either by the 
secretary of the SED Central Committee (embassy staff in Moscow) or by the 
department of foreign policy at the SED CC (all other embassies) (cf. Muth 
2000: 151-152). 
Ad 2) In the second half of the 1950’s, foreign policy became a pivotal 
component in SED’s new agenda of an alternative “peaceful” and “progres-
sive” German state. In this respect, increasing cooperation with developing 
countries seemed to be a promising strategy on the road to international recog-
nition. The usual sequence of action was to launch commercial bureaus or 
agencies first, then to enhance the status of this bureau to that of a consulate 
general and finally to exchange ambassadors. In this way commercial bureaus 
were set up in Egypt (1953), in Syria (1955), in Sudan (1956), and in Iraq 
(1958). This, however, was perceived with growing discomfort in Bonn, be-
cause of West Germany’s claim of sole representation of German interests 
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch). After chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s successful 
visit to Moscow in 1955 and Soviet recognition of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, fears were raised in Bonn, that this would encourage Third world’s 
states to establish diplomatic relations with both Germanies. In december 1955 
West Germany’s Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano proposed the break 
off of all diplomatic relations with states that recognized GDR’s government 
(cf. Winrow 1990: 37-72). This attitude later came to be known as Hallstein 
Doctrine and determined the difficult relationships between the two German 
states for more than one decade. Nevertheless, GDR’s strategy to gain interna-
tional recognition was very successful and so normalization of bilateral rela-
tions had been prepared already in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. But the 
ultimate breakthrough in foreign affairs was substantially brought forward by 
West Germany’s changing attitude towards the East under the government of 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, expressed in the Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) in 
1972. 
                                                             
3  For further details, cf. Wentker 2007: 36-38. 
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Despite major efforts, GDR’s diplomatic staff in the era between 1955 and 
1972 still lacked fundamental qualifications such as foreign language compe-
tences, or negotiation and diplomatic skills (cf. Muth 2000: 169). For example, 
in 1956 still 70 % of all country experts of GDR’s Foreign Ministry had never 
been abroad. Although two years courses in foreign policy already had been 
established at the Institute for International Relations (Institut für Internationa-
le Beziehungen, IIB) in 1950, the motivation to enrol in foreign policy studies 
was low. Nevertheless, until 1971 1,233 students took foreign policy courses at 
the IIB and graduates became to a considerable extent part of GDR’s foreign 
policy elite. 
2. The Social Profile of the GDR’s Diplomatic Corps 
Yet, what were the main characteristics of GDR’s diplomatic corps? This ques-
tion relates to the social profile of the GDR’s ambassadors. For the final phase 
(1972-1989) this population is nearly completely recorded (n = 204) in the 
Central Cadre Database (CCDB, Zentraler Kaderdatenspeicher, ZKDS), a data 
set recorded by the Council of Ministers, the GDR government.4 It provides 
with biographical and prosopographical information on a variety of elites, 
including ambassadors. Besides the job histories of ambassadors, their social 
and political background, party affiliations, marital statuses, vocational / pro-
fessional qualification and other characteristics can be analyzed.5 Thus, first, 
one can answer the question, if the original recruitment principles are mirrored 
in the biographies of ambassadors. Second, the question can be tackled, which 
changes in the social profile occurred between the older and the younger co-
horts.  
Ad 1) Data of the CCDB monitor the composition of the diplomatic corps in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s. 53 out of 204 ambassadors belonged to the older birth 
cohort, born between 1912 and 1927. All other ambassadors, i.e., 151 persons, 
were born between 1928 and 1953, whereas ambassadors born after 1942 are 
the exception (only five ambassadors). My analysis focuses on two birth co-
horts, the generation that had already experienced the start of the Second World 
War as adults or at least the end of the war and the generation of ambassadors 
who experienced their adolescence or early adulthood only after the war. Start-
                                                             
4  The Central Cadre Data Base (CCDB, Zentraler Kaderdatenspeicher, ZKDS) comprises 
around 700,000 personal records; 180,000 out of them refer to leaders at elite and sub-elite 
level from almost all employment sectors of the GDR and contain information about the 
social profile, cadre’s function and the change of functions during a cadre’s life. For a brief 
history of the data selection process, cf. Remy 2003. For printed biographical information 
on members of GDR’s diplomatic corps cf. Radde1977. 
5  Cadre selection and advancement criteria of diplomatic personnel can also be analyzed by 
advanced techniques of data analysis, cf. Gebauer 2009. 
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ing with the older generation of ambassadors, it is remarkable that only six 
ambassadors had originally been members of Germany’s CP or of a foreign CP 
(one case). Also there is evidence of two ambassadors who had been members 
of the NSDAP before 1945. After 1946 all ambassadors of the older birth co-
hort became member of the SED, but some of them no sooner than in the 
1950’s. Data also reveal the social and political origin of the older GDR-
ambassadors: By the majority of 85 %, older GDR-ambassadors had a work-
ing-class blue or white collar family background. Their parents mostly had no 
party affiliation, for only one third of ambassadors a workers party membership 
of the father (or mother) was recorded (see Fig. 1).  
Additionally, from a cultural capital perspective there might have been an 
educational deficit or lack of skills in the early years of the GDR. But later, in 
the era of the 1970’s or 1980’s the older ambassadors obviously caught up: 
Almost all of them (92.5 %) finally held a university degree.  
Figure 1: GDR Ambassadors (born before 1928) – Political Origin (in %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Cadre Data Base (selection), author’s calculation. 
 
Ad 2) With the succession of a new generation of ambassadors, cadre charac-
teristics changed little. Again, more than 85 % of ambassadors born 1928 and 
later had a working class origin and, nearly all of them held a university degree. 
However, there is more diversity with regard to political origins: While among 
older ambassadors, there prevailed families with no party affiliation at all or 
system adequate workers party memberships, now the recruiters also admitted 
sons from families with a former alignment to the NSDAP (13 %, see Fig. 2). 
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Figure 2: GDR Ambassadors (born 1928 or later) – Political Origin (in %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Cadre Data Base (selection), author’s calculation. 
 
3. Career Patterns of GDR Ambassadors and 
Consul Generals 
Empirical analyses of cross sectional data are inspiring, but the CCDB also 
provides longitudinal data that can be analyzed from a life course perspective. 
In order to trace different career patterns Sequence analysis (Optimal Match-
ing) was applied.6 So we are able to determine what percentage of the caseload 
was educated or filled relevant specific positions in the diplomatic corps at a 
given age. At least three career patterns could be identified. A first pattern 
essentially mirrors careers of 53 ambassadors predominantly born in the 1920’s 
and in the early 1930’s. This pattern is best described by “climbing the career 
ladder from the bottom”. Generally, biographical data around the entry into the 
workforce are insufficiently recorded. But this is usually no major problem. As 
can be seen in Fig. 3, there is a quite high percentage of later ambassadors, 
starting with a non-academic education or even without any vocational training 
altogether at the age of 16 years. 
However, this for many was only a short episode. At the age of 23, already 
almost 50 % had been enrolled at universities and also later on a quite high 
proportion of ambassadors was on the way to graduate, particularly, if starting 
from a more disadvantaged position. 
                                                             
6  For a critical introduction to sequence analysis (optimal matching) cf. Abbot/Tsay 2000; in 
relation to the CCDB data optimal matching has already been applied to careers of East 
German managers, cf. Salheiser 2009b: 234-258. A further analysis was carried out on the 
441 First and Second SED Party Secretaries in the Thuringian districts of the GDR, cf. Ge-
bauer / Mestrup 2008. 
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Figure 3: “Old Hands”: From the bottom to the top – becoming ambassador as 
“old hand” of the Foreign Ministry (n=53)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Cadre Data Base (selection), author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 4: “Country Experts” From the university to the top – becoming 
ambassador as experienced country expert (n=48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Cadre Data Base (selection), author’s calculation. 
 
After their study, graduates took significant career steps, by filling positions as 
country experts or assistants at the age of 30 years, or, later (at an age of 40 
years), to a remarkable extent (up to two thirds), on higher ranking positions at 
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GDR’s Foreign Ministry or abroad as member of the diplomatic corps (e.g. 
Attaché or 3rd Secretary), before the majority of them were finally appointed 
as head of a mission or as ambassador (about one third at an age of 52 years).  
A different career pattern can be recognized in the case of the younger genera-
tion of ambassadors, born mainly in the 1930’s or later (see Fig. 4). 
This pattern applies to 48 ambassadors. For these persons academic educa-
tion had been of increased relevance (almost 70 % had enrolled at universities 
or university-like institutes at the age of 23 years), even though non-academic 
education or/and vocational training for many of them was still a significant 
episode in their lives. After graduating, usually a sequence of lower rank posi-
tions in the Foreign Ministry followed, e.g. as country expert or assistant. Here 
the quantitative relevance of this sequence is surprising and differentiates this 
career pattern quite clearly from the former. In general, ambassadors of this 
career pattern reached their career destination earlier than ambassadors of the 
first career pattern (one third at an age of 49 years), some by skipping several 
hierarchical steps. 
Last but not least, there is a further career pattern, applying to 88 former 
GDR-ambassadors (see Fig. 5) who form the most successful stratum of GDR-
ambassadors. Many ambassadors of this career pattern belonged to the older 
generation (n=39, this is a share of three quarter of all older ambassadors). But 
this type of career is also prevalent among the younger generation of ambassa-
dors. The typical sequence is similar to the first career pattern already dis-
cussed above: Usually, these ambassadors started working life by vocational 
training or an even longer episode as employee within such employment sec-
tors as processing industry or domestic trade or even, very interestingly, at the 
ideological branches e.g. the SED-party apparatus or ideological dominated 
mass organizations like the Free German Youth (FDJ), East German Union 
Federation (FDGB) or German Soviet Friendship (DSF). This stage of career 
was a very important one, and relevant steps on the career ladder were taken 
already before entry into the diplomatic corps, obviously often paralleled by an 
academic education.  
After significant steps were taken, by a short sequence of relevant functions, 
like country expert or e.g. head of a department at the Foreign Ministry or as a 
Deputy Chief of a diplomatic mission, these cadres moved up and reached top 
positions at the diplomatic corps. Some also crowned their careers with the 
appointment as minister.7 
                                                             
7  Presumably, this career pattern corresponds to repeated qualified personnel increases in the 
1950’s and 1960’s which came to be known as ‘cadre theft’ (Kaderklau), because these 
cadres had been enticed away from or even assigned by other departments and mass organi-
zations (cf. Muth 2000: 163-184, Wentker 200-205). 
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Figure 5: “Apparatchics” – party activists becoming ambassadors (n=88) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Cadre Data Base (selection), author’s calculation. 
4. Conclusion 
This contribution focussed on the importance and structure of GDR’s Foreign 
Ministry and, particularly, the social profile of GDR’s ambassadors as part of 
the diplomatic body and various relevant career patterns. Even though the 
diplomatic body of the GDR was dismissed after reunification, the relevance of 
the results of these analyses can still be discussed in respect to the diplomatic 
bodies of the other satellite states of the former Soviet empire. Here, the condi-
tions for continuing careers of the diplomatic personnel were far better. This is 
only one additional research perspective. Another one is to address the bio-
graphical trajectories of the dismissed diplomatic personnel after German re-
unification. 
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